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Abstract—This technical note presents a leader-follower
scheme for network aggregative games. The followers and leader
are selfish cost minimizing agents. The cost function of each
follower is affected by strategy of leader and aggregated strategies
of its neighbors through a communication graph. The leader
infinitely often wakes up and receives the aggregated strategy
of the followers, updates its decision value and broadcasts it to
all the followers. Then, the followers apply the updated strategy
of the leader into their cost functions. The establishment of
information exchange between each neighboring pair of followers,
and the activeness of each follower to update its decision at each
iteration are both considered to be drawn from two arbitrary
distributions. Moreover, a distributed algorithm based on sub-
gradient method is proposed for updating the strategies of leader
and followers. The convergence of the proposed algorithm to the
unique generalized Nash equilibrium point of the game is proven
in both almost sure and mean square senses.
Index Terms— Network aggregative game, leader-follower,
stochastic network, sub-gradient method, distributed algorithm.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed optimization over networks has attracted
widespread attention of researchers in recent years [1]. As a
typical framework, each agent in a network aims to minimize
a social or an individual cost function while it communicates
with some other agents through the network. In case that each
agent is modeled as a selfish player who aims to minimize
its own cost and also, the agent’s cost is affected by decision
variables of its neighbors through the network topology, the
problem can be studied as a non-cooperative network game
[2]. If the effect of decision variables of rivals on the agent’s
cost function appears as an aggregative term (e.g. summation
or weighted sum), the network game is known as network
aggregative game (NAG) [3]. Many applications can be studied
via this framework including, power system [4], opinion
dynamics [5], communication system [6], provision of public
goods [7] and criminal networks [8].
In a class of NAGs, the cost function of each agent is
affected by the aggregated strategies of all network agents [9]–
[11] (including neighbors and non-neighbors). In this case,
the coupling term among the agents is the same for all of
them. This assumption does not cover the problems that agents
have different relevancy or limited communication capabilities.
Such challenges motivate studying another type of NAGs in
which agents have their dependency with their neighbors.
In [12], NAGs are studied for the agents with quadratic
cost functions. Therein, some algorithms are proposed which
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converge to the Nash equilibrium point using the best response
functions while at each iteration, agents communicate with
their neighbors and update their strategies. Furthermore, in
[13], a Nash seeking dynamics is utilized for agents with
proximal quadratic cost functions whose best responses are in
the form of proximal operator. In [14], the cost function of the
agents is considered in general form. In this work, a distributed
algorithm has been utilized in which each agent communicates
with all its neighbors at each iteration and updates its strategy
based on its best response function. However, the algorithms
are designed based on the best response scheme which imposes
high computational complexity, specially for a general cost
function. In such a case, as mentioned in [15], the players
naturally dismiss strategies which are characterized by high
computational cost and hence, the gradient response seems to
an appropriate choice for updating the decision of the agents
[16].
In the mentioned researches on NAGs, all the agents are in
the same order of decision making with the same "structure"
of cost functions and communication type. However, in many
applications, there is a high-level agent (leader) who aims to
optimize its own objective function which also depends on the
strategies of other agents at a lower level (followers). Several
researches have investigated leader-follower games [17]–[19]
and it has been extensively utilized in many engineering
fields such as wireless sensor networks [20], supply chain
management [21], and smart grid [22]. If the leader has
complete information about the followers’ cost functions, then
the concept of Stackelberg equilibrium can be applied directly
[18]. In this case, the problem can be solved as a bi-level
optimization in which the leader first computes the reaction
function of the followers with respect to its strategy. Then, by
applying the reaction function of the followers into its own
cost function, the leader finds its optimal strategy. However,
if the leader does not have a-priori information about the
cost function of the followers, then the leader needs to learn
its optimal strategy by iterative methods. In [17], a leader-
following problem is discussed in which the cost function of
the leader is independent of the followers’ strategies and only
the followers respond to leaders’ strategy. In [19], an iterative
hierarchical mean-field game is studied including a leader and
a large number of followers. The leader first announces its
decision and then, followers respond by knowing the leader’s
decision.
In this paper, we propose a leader-follower NAG. The leader
has a different type of cost function from the followers which
is affected by the aggregated strategy of all the followers.
Additionally, the leader has a different type of communication
and activeness from the followers. It is considered that the
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2leader infinitely often: wakes up, receives the last aggregated
strategy of followers, updates its strategy, broadcasts it to all
the followers, and then goes to sleep. In the lower level, the
followers receive the last decision value of the leader and
play a NAG until the next decision update of the leader.
The cost function of each follower is affected by aggregated
strategies of its neighbors and also the strategy of the leader.
We also consider stochastic communication and activeness
of the agents in NAG. At each arbitrary iteration, based on
a stochastic binary distribution, each follower may become
active to update its decision based on the projected sub-
gradient method. Besides, at each iteration, an agent may
receive the decision value of a neighboring agent based
on another stochastic binary distribution. The corresponding
stochastic binary variables of the two mentioned distributions
can be dependent on each other, and further, there might
be some constraints on those variables. Finally, a distributed
algorithm is proposed in which the decision values of the
leader and followers converge to the unique Generalized Nash
Equilibrium (GNE) point of the game.
To the best of our knowledge, compared to single-level
NAGs [12]–[14], this is the first paper that proposes a leader-
follower scheme for NAGs. Further, this is the first paper that
presents a general stochastic framework that simultaneously
considers communication and activeness of the agents in
NAGs in which the Gossip based communication protocol [23]
can be encountered as a special case of the proposed frame-
work. From other aspects, compared to aggregative games
which consider the average strategy of whole population as
a common coupling term among the agents [9]–[11], in this
paper, the local aggregative term is studied in which only
neighbors of each follower, as well as the leader, affect the
follower’s cost function. Compared to the literature of NAGs,
those consider the local aggregative term, we have studied a
general strongly convex cost function instead of quadratic one
[12], [13]. In contrast with the papers which have utilized the
best response dynamics as the agents’ decision update rule
[12]–[14], we have used the projected sub-gradient method
for optimization to cope with the limited computational capa-
bilities of the agents. The main contributions of this paper can
be summarized as follow:
• We propose a leader-follower framework for NAG.
• We study stochastic communication and activeness of the
agents in NAG.
• A distributed algorithm based on projected sub-gradient
method is proposed and its convergence to the unique
GNE point of the game is proven in both almost sure
and mean square senses.
This paper is structured as follows. The system model is
introduced in Section II. In Section III, communications frame-
work and information structure are given and a distributed
optimization algorithm is proposed for decision making of the
agents. The convergence of the algorithm to the GNE point
of the game is proven in Section IV. Simulation results are
presented in Section V. Finally, Section VI summarizes the
results and draws conclusion.
NOTATION AND PRELIMINARIES
N and R are the set of natural and real numbers, re-
spectively. |N | denotes the number of members of the set
N . Let A> denotes the transpose of a vector/matrix A.
||A|| indicates the matrix norm which is equal to the largest
eigenvalue of the matrix. The 2-norm of vector x is defined by
‖x‖ =
√
x>x. col(x1, ..., xN ) = [x>1 , ..., x>N ]> indicates the
column augmentation of column vectors xn for n = 1, ..., N .
~1n = col(1, ..., 1) and ~0n = col(0, ..., 0) where ~1n,~0n ∈ Rn.
The probability function and expected value are denoted by
P{.} and E{.}, respectively. Supposing the function f(.) :
X → R, g(x′) is called the sub-gradient of f(.) at x′ if
∀x ∈ X : f(x′)+(x−x′)>g(x′) ≤ f(x). Also, the projection
operator of X is defined by ΠX (x) = arg miny∈X ||y − x||2.
g(x) is strictly monotone if (g(x2, r)−g(x1, r))>(x2−x1) > 0
for ∀x1, x2 : x1 6= x2.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a set of follower agents N = {1, ..., N} and a
leader involved in a non-cooperative game. The followers are
connected to each other via a communication network repre-
sented by a directed graph G(N ,A) where A = [anm]n,m∈N
is adjacency matrix of G such that anm = 1 if there is a
communication link from follower m to n, and anm = 0
otherwise (more details on communication network of the
followers is given in Section III-A). Each follower n ∈ N has
its decision variable (i.e. strategy) xn ∈ Xn where Xn ⊂ RMF
is a non-empty, compact and convex set. The cost function of
follower n depends on the aggregated strategy of its neighbors
whose set is denoted by Nn, and also the strategy of the leader.
Therefore, the cost function of follower n is defined as follows
JFn (xn, σn(x−n), y) : xn ∈ Xn (1)
where x−n = col(x1, ..., xn−1, xn+1, ..., xN ), and y ∈ Y
is the strategy of leader which is selected from a compact
and convex set denoted by Y ⊂ RML . Also, we define
dn(xn, σn(x−n), y) as a sub-gradient of JFn (xn, σn(x−n), y))
with respect to xn. σn(x−n) is the aggregated strategy of
follower-n’s neighbors which is defined as
σn(x−n) =
∑
m∈Nn
wnmxm. (2)
where
∑
m∈N−{n}
wnm = 1, wnm > 0 if anm = 1, and wnm =
0 if anm = 0. Hence, we can define the weight matrix of
the graph G by W = [wnm]n,m∈N . The cost function of the
leader is defined as follows
JL(y, σ0(xN )) : y ∈ Y. (3)
Further, d0(y, xN ) denotes a sub-gradient of JL(y, σ0(xN ))
with respect to y. The cost function of leader is also affected
by the aggregated strategy of the followers σ0(xN ) defined by
σ0(xN ) =
∑
n∈N
w0nxn (4)
where xN = col(x1, ..., xN ), w0n denotes the weight of
bidirectional communication link between follower n and the
3leader, and we have
∑
n∈N w0n = 1, and w0n ≥ 0. let
~w0 = col(w01, ..., w0N ) denotes the leader weight vector.
Accordingly, the non-cooperative game among the followers
and leader is defined as follows
G =

Players: followers N and the leader
Strategies:
{
Follower n: xn ∈ Xn
Leader: y ∈ Y
Cost:
{
Follower n: JFn (xn, σn(x−n), y)
Leader: JL(y, σ0(xN ))
(5)
Assumption 1: JFn (xn, σn(x−n), y) and J
L(y, σ0(xN )) are
sub-differentiable and strongly convex over Xn and Y with
respect to xn and y, respectively. i.e. there exist Cn and C0
for ∀n ∈ N such that
(dn(xn, σ, y)− dn(x′n, σ, y))>(xn − x′n) ≥ Cn||xn − x′n||2
(d0(y, σ)− d0(y′, σ))>(y − y′) ≥ C0||y − y′||2
(6)
Also, there exist Lipschitz constants L and L0 such that
∀n ∈ N ,∀xn ∈ Xn, y ∈ Y,∀σ1, σ2 ∈ {σn(x−n)|x−n ∈∏
m 6=n Xm}, we have
||dn(xn, σ1, y1)− dn(xn, σ2, y2)|| ≤ L||σ1 − σ2||
+ L||y1 − y2||
||d0(y, σ1)− d0(y, σ2)|| ≤ L0||σ1 − σ2||
(7)
where dn(xn, σn(x−n), y) and d0(y, σn(x−n)) are the sub-
gradients of JFn and J
L, respectively. 
The equilibrium point of the aforementioned leader-follower
game is defined as follows:
Definition 1: (x∗N , y
∗) is a Generalized Nash equilibrium
(GNE) point of the leader-follower game between the follow-
ers and the leader if
∀xn ∈ Xn :JFn (x∗n, σ(x∗−n), y∗) ≤ JFn (xn, σ(x∗−n), y∗)
∀y ∈ Y :JL(y∗, σ0(x∗N )) ≤ JL(y, σ0(x∗N ))
(8)
∀n ∈ N where x∗−n = col(x∗1, ..., x∗n−1, x∗n+1, ..., x∗N ) and
x∗N = col(x∗1, ..., x∗N ). 
III. THE LEADER-FOLLOWER NETWORK GAME
A. Communication and Information Structure
1) Followers’ Communication and Activeness: We consider
that follower n receives information of its neighbor m ∈ Nn
at iteration k with probability pkmn. Furthermore, the follower
n is active at iteration k to update its decision with probability
qkn. Let random binary variables l
k
n,m and e
k
n denote the
establishment of communication from follower n to m, and
activeness of follower n at iteration k, respectively. Clearly,
∀k ≥ 0 : lkn,m = 0 for non-neighbor followers (anm = 0).
Then, the last information of follower n from follower m
denoted by x˜kn,m is updated as follows:
x˜k+1n,m = (1− lkn,m)x˜kn,m + lkn,mxkm. (9)
Based on (9), the aggregated strategy of neighborhoods of
follower n at iteration k is calculated as σ˜kn = σn(x˜
k
n,−n)
where x˜kn,−n = col(x˜kn,1, ..., x˜kn,n−1, x˜kn,n+1, ..., x˜kn,N ).
Let’s consider Lk = [lnm]n,m∈N and Ek = col(ek1 , ..., ekN )
as the connectivity matrix and the activity vector of the
followers at iteration k, respectively. The constraint set P
represents the set from which Lk and Ek are selected for
all iterations ∀k ≥ 0. Further, Hk denotes the history set
of stochastic variables Lk and Ek up to iteration k which is
defined by Hk+1 = Hk ∪ {(Lk, Ek)} and H1 = {(L0, E0)}.
In this paper, the probabilities of Lk and Ek are considered to
be possibly dependent to Hk and P as follows:
P{lknm = 1|Fk} = pknm,P{ekn = 1|Fk} = qkn (10)
where Fk = Hk ∩P . Apparently, Fk ⊂ Fk+1 holds for ∀k ≥
0. To illustrate the dependency among stochastic variables, in
what follows, the well-known Gossip-based communication
protocol [23] has been studied as an example of the proposed
communication framework.
Example 1 (Gossip-based Communication): Suppose that
the followers communicate to each other through an undirected
graph G(N ,A). In gossip-based communication, each node
has an independent stochastic clock which ticks with rate 1
Poisson process and makes the corresponding agent become
active. The simultaneous clock ticks are neglected and as a
result, at most one agent wakes up at each time slot of global
clock. For instance, at kth time slot, let the clock of agent
n ticks. It wakes up and contacts with only one neighbor
(say agent m). They communicate with each other, update
their strategies and then both go to sleep. In this case, our
communication framework imposes the following constraints:
P =
{
(Lk, Ek)
∣∣∣∣ ∑
n∈N
ekn = 2, l
k
nm = e
k
ne
k
m,
ekne
k
m ≤ anm,∀n,m ∈ N
} (11)
The first constraint indicates that only two player could be
active in iteration k. lknm = e
k
ne
k
m implies that a link is
established when both of its sender and receiver are active.
In addition, lknm = l
k
mn can be concluded from this constraint.
Furthermore, inequality constraint ekne
k
m ≤ anm prevents two
non-neighbors to become active. The probability of each link
and each node are calculated as follows:
pknm =
1
N
(
1
|Nn| +
1
|Nm| ), q
k
n =
1
N
(1 +
∑
m∈Nn
1
|Nm| ) (12)
where Nn = {m|amn = 1}. 
Assumption 2: There exist γ > 0 and δ > 0 such that
pnm ≥ γ and qn ≥ δ for ∀n ∈ N ,∀m ∈ Nm. 
Note that pnm = 0 for ∀n ∈ N ,∀m /∈ Nm.
2) Communication between leader and followers: It is
assumed that the leader does not exchange information with
the followers at every iterations. Instead, it is considered that
the leader infinitely often wakes up and receives aggregated
strategy of the followers in an arbitrary desired iteration set
KL = {kLi }∞i=0. The leader also updates its decision variable
and broadcasts it to all the followers at the same iteration. It
is supposed that kL0 = 0.
Assumption 3: There is K¯ <∞ such that kLi+1 − kLi ≤ K¯
for ∀i ∈ N. 
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Fig. 1: The information scheme of leader-follower network game
between followers ("F" shapes) and the leader ("L" shape). The filled
and unfilled objects indicate the active and inactive agents to make
decision, respectively. The dashed line indicates that there exists a
communication line, but it’s not establish at iteration k.
The schematic of information flows among followers and
between followers and leader is shown in Fig. 1. Each
information exchange among followers could be established
stochastically ∀n,m ∈ N .
B. Decision Making
In this paper, the projected sub-gradient method is utilized
for decision making of each follower as follows
xk+1n = ΠXn(x
k
n − eknαkngkn) (13)
where gkn = dn(x
k
n, σ˜
k
n, y
k) and αkn is the step size of follower
n at iteration k. Clearly, xkn is not updated if e
k
n = 0. Also,
the leader updates its strategy at k ∈ KL as follows
yk+1 = ΠY(yk − αk0gk0 );∀k ∈ KL
yk+1 = yk;∀k /∈ KL (14)
where gk0 = d0(y
k, σk0 ) and α
k
0 is the step size of the leader
at iteration k. Without loss of the generality, we set αk+10 =
αk0 , ∀k /∈ KL. In this paper, the following assumptions are
considered for the step sizes of the players.
Assumption 4: αkn, ∀n ∈ N ∪ {0} are Non-increasing,∑∞
k=0 α
k
n =∞, and
∑∞
k=0(α
k
n)
2 <∞. 
Assumption 5: There exists κ such that αk ≤ καk where
αk = max(αk1 , ..., αkN , αk0) and αk = min(αk1 , ..., αkN , αk0). 
The optimization procedure for the leader-follower network
game is presented in Algorithm 1. Based on Algorithm 1,
the leader makes decision at iterations kLi ∈ KL and waits
in other iterations, while the followers are making decision.
In other words, the followers continue their interactions and
decision makings based on the last informed decision of the
leader for some iterations, until the next decision of the leader
is announced. The initial values of the parameters are chosen
from their feasible region.
IV. CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS
In this section, the convergence of Algorithm 1 to the unique
GNE point of G is studied. Under Assumption 1, as a result of
strong convexity of the cost functions, there exists a GNE point
Algorithm 1 The leader-follower network game algorithm
Initialize xn, y and x˜nm for ∀n,m ∈ N and k ← 0
Iteration
Leader:
σ0 ← σ0(xN )
g0 ← d0(y, σ0)
y ← ΠY(y − αk0g0))
Repeat
Follower n ∈ N :
If ekn = 1:
σ˜n ← σn(x˜n,−n)
gn ← dn(xn, σ˜n, y)
xn ← ΠXn(xn − αkngn)
update x˜nm via (9) based on lknm
k ← k + 1
Until k ∈ KL
z∗ = (x∗N , y
∗) for G [24]. Before discussing the convergence,
we propose the following lemmas:
Lemma 1 (Theorem 1 of [25]): Let zk, βk, ηk, and ζk be
non-negative Fk-measurable random variables. Also, assume
that Fk is σ-algebra and Fk ⊂ Fk+1 holds for ∀k ≥ 0.
If
∑∞
k=0 βk and
∑∞
k=0 ηk almost surely converge, and the
following equation
E{zk+1|Fk} ≤ (1 + βk)zk + ηk − ζk (15)
holds, then zk and
∑∞
k=0 ζk <∞ almost surely converge. 
Lemma 2: ||xk+1n − xkn|| ≤ Anαkn for ∀n,m ∈ N where
||dn(xn, σ, y)|| ≤ An,∀xn ∈ Xn. 
Proof: See Appendix A.
Lemma 3:
∑∞
k=0 α
k
n||∆x˜knm|| < ∞ for ∀n,m ∈ N in
almost sure sense where ∆x˜knm = x˜
k
nm − xkm. 
Proof: See Appendix B.
Using lemmas 2 and 3 , the convergence of Algorithm 1 is
proven in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1: Consider Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. If the
constants Cn and C0 in (6) satisfy Cn > κδ L¯ and C0 > κK¯L¯∀n ∈ N , Algorithm 1 almost surly converges to the GNE
point of the leader-follower game where L¯ = max(2L,L0).

Proof: Consider the notation ∇xkn = xkn − x∗n.
Based on Proposition 1.5.8 of [26], x∗n = ΠXn(x
∗
n −
eknα
k
ndn(x
∗
n, σ
∗
n, y
∗)) where σ∗n = σn(x
∗
−n). Since the projec-
tion operator ΠXn(.) is non-expansive and e
k
n ≤ 1, we have
||∇xk+1n ||2 ≤ ||∇xkn − eknαkn
(
dn(x
k
n, σ˜
k
n, y
k)
− dn(x∗n, σ∗n, y∗)
)||2 = ||∇xkn||2+
(eknα
k
n)
2||dn(xkn, σ˜kn, yk)− dn(x∗n, σ∗n, y∗)||2
− 2eknαkn
(
dn(x
k
n, σ˜
k
n, y
k)− dn(x∗n, σ∗n, y∗)
)>∇xkn
≤ ||∇xkn||2 + 4A2n(αkn)2 − 2eknαknΨkn
− 2eknαkn
(
dn(x
k
n, σ˜
k
n, y
k)− dn(xkn, σkn, yk)
)>∇xkn
(16)
where Ψkn =
(
dn(x
k
n, σ
k
n, y
k) − dn(x∗n, σ∗n, y∗)
)>∇xkn, σkn =
σn(x
k
−n). Let consider that ||x1−x2|| ≤ Bn for ∀x1, x2 ∈ Xn.
5According to Assumption 1, we have
− eknαkn
(
dn(x
k
n, σ˜
k
n, y
k)− dn(xkn, σkn, yk)
)>∇xkn
≤ αknL||σ˜kn − σkn||||∇xkn|| ≤ LBnαkn||σ˜kn − σkn||
≤ LBnαkn
∑
m∈Nn
wnm||∆x˜knm||.
(17)
Therefore, by putting (17) into (16), we have
||∇xk+1n ||2 ≤ ||∇xkn||2 + 4A2n(αkn)2
− 2eknαknΨkn + 2LBnαkn
∑
m∈Nn
wnm||∆x˜knm||
≤ ||∇x0n||2 + 4A2n
k∑
k′=0
(αk
′
n )
2 − 2
k∑
k′=0
ek
′
n α
k′
n Ψ
k′
n
+ 2LBn
∑
m∈Nn
wnm
k∑
k′=0
αk
′
n ||∆x˜k
′
nm||
(18)
Suppose the notation ∇yk = yk − y∗. Considering the
leader’s decision at leader’s iteration kLj , and following the
same operation from (16) to (18), we have
||∇ykLj +1||2 ≤ ||∇ykLj ||2 + 4(αk
L
j
0 )
2A20 − 2α
kLj
0 Ψ
kLj
0
≤ ||∇y0||2 + 4
j∑
i=0
(α
kLi
0 )
2A20 − 2
j∑
i=0
α
kLi
0 Ψ
kLi
0 .
(19)
where Ψk0 =
(
d0(y
k, σk0 ) − d0(y∗, σ∗0)
)>∇yk, σk0 = σ0(xkN ),
σ∗0 = σ0(x
∗
N ) and ||d0(y, σ0)|| ≤ A0. Now, let define
Φj = ||∇ykLj−1+1||2 +∑n∈N ||∇xkLj−1+1n ||2. Therefore, using
inequalities (18) and (19), we have:
E{Φj+1∣∣FkLj } ≤ Φj + 4(αkLj0 )2A20 + 4 ∑
n∈N
A2n
∑
k′∈K′j
(αk
′
n )
2
+ 2L
∑
n∈N
∑
m∈Nn
Bnwnm
∑
k′∈K′j
αk
′
n ||∆x˜k
′
nm||
− 2αk
L
j
0 Ψ
kLj
0 − 2
∑
n∈N
∑
k′∈K′j
αk
′
n E{ek
′
n
∣∣Fk′}Ψk′n .
(20)
where K′j = {kLj−1 + 1, . . . , kLj }. Based on definition of Ψk
′
n ,
and adding and subtracting the term dn(x∗n, σ
k′
n , y
k′), we have
Ψk
′
n =
(
dn(x
k′
n , σ
k′
n , y
k′)− dn(x∗n, σk
′
n , y
k′)
)>∇xk′n
+
(
dn(x
∗
n, σ
k′
n , y
k′)− dn(x∗n, σ∗n, y∗)
)>∇xk′n . (21)
Based on strongly convexity and Lipschitz property in As-
sumption 6, we have
− αk′n ek
′
n Ψ
k′
n ≤ −αk
′
n e
k′
n Cn||∇xk
′
n ||2 + αk
′
n L
(||∇ykLi ||
+ ||σkLi0 − σ∗0 ||
)||∇xk′n ||. (22)
Now, using Assumptions 5, we can write (22) as follows
− αk′n ek
′
n Ψ
k′
n ≤ −αk
′
Cne
k′
n ||∇xk
′
n ||2
+ αk
′
κL||∇xk′n ||(||∇yk
′ ||+
∑
m∈Nn
wnm||∇xk′m||). (23)
By following the same procedure for the leader, we have
−αk
L
j
0 Ψ
kLj
0 ≤− αk
L
j C0||∇ykLj ||2
+ αk
L
j L0
∑
n∈N
w0n||∇xk
L
j
n ||||∇ykLj ||. (24)
Considering Assumption 2, it’s clear that E{ek′n
∣∣Fk′} = qkn ≥
δ. Therefore, applying inequalities (23) and (24) into the last
two terms of (20), it can be concluded that
− αkLj Ψk
L
j
0 −
∑
n∈N
∑
k′∈K′j
αk
′
n E{ek
′
n
∣∣Fk′}Ψk′n ≤
− αkLj C0||∇ykLj ||2 −
∑
n∈N
∑
k′∈K′j
δαk
′
Cn||∇xk′n ||2
+
∑
k′∈K′j
αk
′
vk
′>Vk′vk′ .
(25)
where vk
′
= col(||∇xk′1 ||, ..., ||∇xk
′
N ||, ||∇yk
′ ||) and
Vk′ =

[
LW L~1N
L0 ~w
>
0 0
]
k′ ∈ KL[
LW L~1N
~0>N 0
]
k′ /∈ KL
It is straightforward to see that the summation of each row of
the matrices
[
LW L~1N
]
and
[
L0 ~w
>
0 0
]
are equal to
2L and L0, respectively. Therefore, based on Perron-Frobenius
Theorem [27], ||Vk′ || ≤ max(2L,L0) and ||Vk′ || ≤ 2L for
k′ ∈ KL and k′ /∈ KL, respectively. Hence, vk′>V k′vk′ ≤
L¯||vk′ ||2 for ∀k′ ≥ 0. Therefore,∑
k′∈K′j
αk
′
vk
′>Vk′vk′ ≤
∑
k′∈K′j
αk
′
L¯||∇xk′n ||2
+ αk
L
j (kLj − kLj−1)L¯||∇yk
L
j ||2.
(26)
where the last term of (26) is rearranged, since the leader only
makes decision at kLj ∈ KL and therefore, the term ||∇yk
L
j ||2
is the same from iteration kLj−1 to k
L
j . By putting (25) and
(26) into (20), it can be concluded that
E{Φj+1∣∣FkLj } ≤ Φj + 4(αkLj0 )2A20 + 4 ∑
n∈N
A2n
∑
k′∈K′j
(αk
′
n )
2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T j1
+ 2L
∑
n∈N
∑
m∈Nn
Bnwnm
∑
k′∈K′j
αk
′
n ||∆x˜k
′
nm||︸ ︷︷ ︸
T j2
− 2αkLj (C0 − κ(kLj − kLj−1)L¯)||∇yk
L
j ||2︸ ︷︷ ︸
T j3
− 2
∑
n∈N
∑
k′∈K′j
αk
′
(δCn − κL¯)||∇xk′n ||2︸ ︷︷ ︸
T j4
.
(27)
Based on Assumption 4,
∑∞
j=0 T
j
1 is bounded. Also, based
on Lemma 3 we have
∑∞
j=0 T
j
1 < ∞. According to As-
sumption 3, C0 − (kLj − kLj−1)κL¯ ≥ C0 − K¯κL¯ > 0 and
6δCn − κL¯ > 0. Therefore, T j3 and T j4 are positive. Now,
the assumptions of Lemma 1 are satisfied and as a result,
and consequently,
∑∞
j=0 T
j
3 + T
j
4 < ∞ converges almost
surely. Because of positiveness of T j3 and T
j
4 ,
∑∞
j=0 T
j
3 <∞
and
∑∞
j=0 T
j
4 < ∞ are concluded. Therefore, based on∑∞
k=0 α
k ≥ 1κ
∑∞
k=0 α
k = ∞, both ||∇xk′n ||2 and ||∇yk
L
i ||2
almost surely converge to 0. Thus, xkn and y
k converge almost
surely to x∗n and y
∗.
Theorem 1 results almost sure convergence of Algorithm
1. Nevertheless, almost sure convergence does not generally
lead to mean square convergence. Proposition 1 proves the
convergence of Algorithm 1 in mean square sense.
Proposition 1: Under Assumptions of Theorem 1, Algo-
rithm 1 converges in mean square sense. 
Proof: Since almost sure convergence results
the convergence in distribution, the expectation of∑∞
j=0 T
j
3 < ∞ and
∑∞
j=0 T
j
4 < ∞ converges.
Therefore,
∑∞
j=0 α
kLj E{||∇ykLj ||2} < ∞ and∑∞
k=0 α
kE{||∇xkn||2} < ∞. Hence, because of∑∞
k=0 α
k >∞, E{||∇ykLj ||2} and E{||∇xkn||2} converges to
0 which means that xkn and y
k converge in mean square to
x∗n and y
∗.
In Theorem 1, the convergence of the algorithm to a GNE
point is studied. In the following proposition, the uniqueness
of the GNE point is proven.
Proposition 2: Under the assumptions of Theorem 1, the
game (5) has a unique GNE. 
Proof: Let define z = col(x1, ..., xN , y) and
z′ = col(x′1, ..., x′N , y′). Also, consider the function g(z) =
col(d1(x1, σ1(xN ), y), ..., dN (xN , σN (xN ), y), d0(y, σ0(xN ))).
Therefore, by following the procedure of (23) and (24), we
have
Ψ = (z − z′)>(g(z)− g(z′)) =
(y − y′)>(d0(y, σ0(xN )− d0(y′, σ0(x′N ))
+
∑
n∈N
(xn − x′n)>(dn(xn, σ1(xN ), y)− dn(x′n, σ1(x′N ), y′))
≥ C0||∇y||2 − L0
∑
n∈N
w0n||∇xn||||∇y||
+
∑
n∈N
Cn||∇xn||2 − L
(||∇y||+ ∑
m∈Nn
wnm||∇xm||
)||∇xn||
(28)
where ∇xn = xn − x′n and ∇y = y − y′. Considering v =
col(||∇x1||, ..., ||∇xN ||, ||∇y||), it can be concluded that
Ψ ≥ C0||∇y||2 +
∑
n∈N
Cn||∇xn||2 − v>Rv
R =
[
LW L~1N
L0 ~w
>
0 0
]
.
Based on Perron-Frobenius Theorem, v>Rv ≤ L¯||v||2. Also,
it is clear that ||v||2 = ||∇y||2 +∑n∈N ||∇xn||2. Therefore,
it can be deduced that
Ψ ≥ (C0 − L¯)||∇y||2 +
∑
n∈N
(Cn − L¯)||∇xn||2. (29)
Based on the assumptions of Theorem 1, Cn ≥ κδ L¯ > L¯ and
C0 > κK¯L¯ ≥ L¯ because κ, K¯ ≥ 1 and δ ≤ 1. Hence, g(z)
is strictly monotone since Ψ > 0. Consequently, according to
Theorem 2 of [24], the GNE of the game (5) is unique.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
As an application of leader-follower network aggregative
game, we study the power allocation of small cell networks
proposed in [6]. Consider a network consisting of N small
cells, all of which underlay a macrocell with a macrocell
base station (MBS). Small cells and macrocell provide radio
coverage for cellular networks. However, small cells are low-
power and have limited coverage range in comparison with
macrocell. Each small cell is considered to have a small cell
base station (SBS) which can cover many users. Deployment
of multiple SBS in a region may cause some overlapping
coverage region among SBSs. In such region, transmission
powers of SBSs cause the signal interference in cellular
networks. As a result, based on Shanon formula utilized in
(30), the data rate will be decreased. In this case, the inter-
ference appears as an aggregative term in the cost function of
neighboring SBSs and therefore, the problem can be modeled
as a network aggregative game. In this NAG, each SBS aims to
adjust its transmission power to minimize its cost. Moreover,
MBS, as a leader of small cells’ network, determines the
price of transmission power for SBSs as its decision variable.
Consequently, there is a leader-follower NAG among the SBSs
and MBS. Let N denotes the set of small cells. xn denotes
the power of SBS n ∈ N which satisfies 0 ≤ xn ≤ P¯n. The
objective function of SBS n ∈ N is as follows:
Jn(xn, x−n, λ) = Rn(Sn)− λvnxn
Rn(Sn) = ALn(1 + Sn)
Sn =
r−βn xn
N0 +
∑
m∈Nn r
−β
nmxm
, vn =
∑
n∈N
r−βnm
(30)
where Sn and Rn(Sn) indicate signal to interference and
noise ratio and the data rate corresponding to the SBS n,
respectively. A is the channel bandwidth and so, the first term
in (30) represents the transmission rate of SBS n. SBS n has
the strategy xn. rn and rnm are the average distance of SBS n
to its users and the distance of SBS n to SBS m, respectively.
Based on the coverage range, SBS n could be interfered from a
set of other SBSs indicated by Nn. β is the path-loss exponent
and N0 is the white noise spectral density. The penalty term
λvnxn specifies the cost for making interference to other SBSs
in the network where, λ is the penalty price. The objective
function of the MBS is as follows:
J0(λ, xN ) = λ
∑
n∈N
vnxn −B0λ2 (31)
λ satisfies 0 ≤ λ ≤ λ¯. The term B0λ2 prevents MBS to
increase λ too much. Based on the proposed framework of
the game, the MBS and SBSs can be considered as a leader
and followers, respectively.
For simulation, 10 SBSs are considered to be stochastically
located in a circular region with radius 4km. It is assumed
that each of two SBSs with less than 1km distances are
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Fig. 2: The price of leader along the algorithm iterations.
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Fig. 3: The average power of followers along the algorithm iterations.
neighbors and have an interference effect on each other. Also,
A = 2048bps, P¯n = 6w, β = 1, for ∀n ∈ N . Also λ¯ = 7 and
B0 = 100. We assume that MBS (the leader) makes decisions
periodically once at every 10 iterations. The simulation is done
for three communication protocols; 1) Normal (pknm = q
k
n = 1
for ∀n ∈ N ,m ∈ Nn,∀k ≥ 0) 2) Stochastic (pknm = qkn = 0.7
for ∀n ∈ N ,m ∈ Nn,∀k ≥ 0) 3) Gossip. The results for the
leader’s price and average power of the followers are shown
in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, respectively. As it can be seen from Fig.
2, the price diagram is a piecewise-constant signal based on
periodic iterations of the leader. Also, as shown in Fig. 3, the
price converges slowly in gossip-based protocol compared to
two other protocols, since just two of followers communicate
and update at each iteration. Clearly, the lesser the number of
updates, the slower the progress of optimization toward the
equilibrium point for the followers. The stochastic scenario
has an acceptable performance in comparison with Normal
scenario, but with lesser active agents. Therefore, the agents
can economically communicate with each other and update
their decisions.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a leader-follower scheme was proposed for
network aggregative games. Each follower was affected by
both aggregated strategies of its neighbors and the leader.
But, the leader was only affected by an aggregation of all
followers’ strategies. The leader and followers were adopted
to different types of communication protocols. The leader
infinitely often became active and updated its decision and
broadcasted it to the followers, nevertheless, each follower
became active and communicated with its neighbors based on
two different stochastic binary distributions. In particular, the
aim was to find the optimal non-cooperative game solution
when the agents are selfish players. A distributed optimization
algorithm was proposed and it was proven that the algorithm
converges to the unique GNE point of the game in both mean
square and almost sure senses. To prove the convergence of
algorithm, we imposed the assumption of strong convexity to
the cost functions. There are some methods in the literature
such as Tikhonov regularization and Proximal point [28], [29]
which can handle the optimization problem with lower level of
convexity. To this end, these methods utilize an extra quadratic
term in the update rule of optimization. As a future work of
this technical note, one can explore such methods to find a
more relaxed condition on the cost function of the leader and
followers.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 2
Based on (13) and ekn ≤ 1, we have
||xk+1n − xkn|| = ||ΠXn(xkn − eknαkndn(xkn, σ˜kn, yk))− xkn||
≤ eknαkn||dn(xkn, σ˜kn, yk)|| ≤ αknAn.
B. Proof of Lemma 3
From (9) and Lemma 2, it can be deduced that
E{||∆x˜k+1nm ||
∣∣Fk} = (1− E{lknm∣∣Fk})||x˜knm − xk+1m ||
= (1− pknm)||(x˜knm − xkm)− (xk+1m − xkm)||
≤ (1− γ)(||∆x˜knm||+ αkmAm).
(32)
From assumption 4, αkn is non-increasing, e.i. α
k+1
n ≤ αkn.
Therefore, by multiplying αk+1n ≤ αkn and (32), we have:
E{αk+1n ||∆x˜k+1nm ||
∣∣Fk}
≤ (1− γ)(αkn||∆x˜knm||+ αknαkmAm)
= αkn||∆x˜knm|| − γαkn||∆x˜knm||+ (1− γ)αknαkmAm.
(33)
Based on Assumption 4, it is straightforward that∑∞
k=1 α
k
pα
k
m <∞. Consequently, the assumptions of Lemma
1 are satisfied in (33). As a result,
∑∞
k=1 α
k
n||∆x˜knm|| <∞.
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